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PROPERTY
by
Richard W. Hemingway*

F

ROM the literally hundreds of decisions that have been handed down in
the real property area by Texas courts in the past year, only the most
significant are included in this survey. The decisions selected for discussion are
representative of what the Texas courts have been doing in this field. Specific
areas included are:
I. Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens
II. Attorney's Fees as Claims for Labor Done and Materials Furnished
III. Land Development and Contracts of Sale
IV. Notes and Deeds of Trust
V. Homestead
VI. Usury
The cases are discussed in no particular order; however, within each area,
supreme court cases generally appear first.
1. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

Unquestionably, the most significant case in this area is Hayek v. Western
Steel Co.,' a five-to-four decision with a vigorous dissent, handed down by
the supreme court in March 1972. Although some twelve causes of action
and different owners were involved, the facts may be simplified. In essence,
it was a situation in which an owner of land desired to build an improvement, such as a house or apartment building on the land, and acted as his
own general contractor and builder. The owner contracted for the concrete
work for a foundation, which would cost some $50,000. He paid the contractor, but did not pay the materialmen and suppliers who furnished the
steel and concrete to the foundation contractor. Unpaid claims of such
materialmen and suppliers amounted to some $20,000. The issue was whether
article 5469' required that the owner retain either (1) ten percent of the
value of the total improvement being built, or (2) ten percent of a particular
contract for specific work. In this case ten percent of the total value of the
improvement being constructed would exceed the amount of the unpaid claims,
but ten percent of the foundation contract, $5,000, would fall far short of the
amount of unpaid claims.
The court held that an owner must retain ten percent of the value of the
entire improvement being constructed. There was no question of a lien being
created upon the property, as the total amount of liability was covered by a
deposit made into the registry of the court. The court noted that it was not
the intent of the legislature, in passing the Hardeman Act,' to change the
concept of the retainage fund as a protection for all claimants, although the
Act changed the wording of the former statute concerning retainage from ten
0 J.D., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., University of Michigan. Horn Professor
of Law, Texas Tech University.
1478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1972).
2TEx. Rav. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1972).
sId. arts. 5452-71, 5472c, 5472d.
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percent of the contract price "of such building," to "of such work." The court
stated:
The obvious purpose of this statute is to provide, with respect to the construction of any building, a single protective fund equal to ten per cent of the
cost or value of the entire building, with all complying third party claimants
having the right to share ratably in such fund and in a lien to such extent
against the entire building. The general class to be protected by this ratable
sharing of the fund and lien is comprised of all mechanics, artisans and materialmen . . . without regard to whether there be one or multiple original

contracts or sub-contracts.'
Hayek has created obvious problems for an owner who acts as his own
general contractor and executes multiple contracts. It appears that the owner
must retain ten percent of the total improvement value for thirty days after
the completion of the entire project, although this may be several months or
years later than completion of any specific work, such as the foundation. But
when the owner is retaining payments due to materialmen, what happens if,
at the end of the job, payments due to artisans and mechanics have depleted
the retained fund so that insufficient money is left for the materialmen? The
case seems a misconstruction of the plain working of the statute. A reading
of the dissent reveals further problems caused by the decision.
Another supreme court case in the area of mechanics' and materialmen's
liens was Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Felker! This case dealt with the claim of an
electrical contractor involved in the construction of a shopping center. Although a general contractor had been designated, it was found that the electrical contractor had contracted directly with the owner. As this contract had
not been abandoned, it was held that he was an original contractor under the
Hardeman Act." The general contractor had furnished a payment bond. When
he did not receive payment, the electrical contractor made a claim against the
surety. The court quoted from the statute' and the wording of the bond,' and
held that the plaintiff could not recover because the bond ran only to subcontractors and materialmen, not to original contractors. However, the court
was careful to emphasize that it was not holding that the payment bond could
not be written to cover original contractors. Although some elements of
estoppel against the surety may have been present (in that the surety participated in the arrangement of the general contract and its fee was based, in
part, on the bid for electrical work by the plaintiff), the estoppel question was
not decided by the court, since it had not been pleaded.
In another case dealing with the retainage statute,' a materialman brought
suit against the landowner and a contractor seeking an accounting for materials furnished in the construction of additions to a lakehouse which was
the homestead of the landowner. The contractor had entered into an oral
contract with the owner for the improvements and had later defaulted. The
4478 S.W.2d at 794.
'469 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1971).
OTEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5452-71, 5472c, 5472d (Supp. 1972).
1469 S.W.2d at 392.
8Id. at 393.
9Langford v. Reeves, 478 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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plaintiff materialman made no claim for a lien (which he obviously did not
have), but claimed that the owner was personally liable because he did not
retain ten percent of the contract price, as required by statute."0 The court held
that no personal liability existed; the existence of a valid lien is a condition
precedent to the operation of the retainage statute. Since there had been no
compliance with the provisions of the statute dealing with the creation of
liens upon a homestead, 1 an action to impose personal liability on the owner
could not be maintained.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Industrial Handling Engineers, Inc.," dealt with
a case of first impression under the Hardeman Act. The case involved the
question of when the time for notice of nonpayment to a subcontractor begins
to run, where the materials at the time of original delivery by the subcontractor
are not usable and do not become usable until a later date. The plaintiff, a
subcontractor, furnished a platform lift as part of one of the buildings in a
shopping center under construction. The lift was delivered to the job by
plaintiff in September 1966, but was left in the crate and not installed until
November 1966. The delay was due to the time necessary to obtain a transformer needed to make the lift operable. After installation, the prime contractor was billed by the plaintiff, but no payment was made. Notice was
given on February 14, 1967, which was timely from the date of final installation, but which was not timely from the date of first delivery on the job site.
Suit was brought against the surety on the payment bond. The plaintiff argued
that the time for notice ran from the date indebtedness accrued under the
statute,"3 i.e., the tenth day of the month following the last month that labor
was performed. The court held against the subcontractor; notice was late and
not timely. It was stated that notice provisions under the Hardeman Act'
were now similar to those of the McGregor Act.' Notice to the surety did not
run from the time of accrual of indebtedness, but from the time of delivery
of materials, i.e., ninety days from the tenth day of the month next following
each month that materials are delivered in whole or in part.
Another case dealing with the giving of notice" involved the McGregor
Act. Notice was mailed by the subcontractor on the eighty-ninth day of the
notice period and was received by the surety by the ninety-first day. The court
stated that it was a case of first impression in this state, and held that notice
was given when placed in a properly addressed and stamped envelope and
deposited in the mails. The case seems correct, since the statute" provides for
the mailing of notice, but does not spell out the effect of deposit in the mails.
It may be noted that the Hardeman Act expressly provides for this result.
Two relatively minor cases dealt with materialman claimants trying to reach
'TEx. REV. Civ.
" Id. art. 5460.

STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1972).

1"474 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971).
1"TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5467 (Supp. 1972).
'4 1d. art. 5453(2)(b)(1).
"Id. arts. 5160, 5472a, 5472b, 5472b-1.
"oJohnson Serv. Co. v. Climate Control Contractors, Inc., 478 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1972).
17 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (1971).
"Id. art. 5456 (Supp. 1972).
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retained funds on public works over $2,000 that were covered by the McGregor Act. Under this Act, when the contract for improvements involves
more than $2,000, no claim may be made against the land or owner, but the
claimant is restricted to rights against the surety on the bond."9 In the first
case"° the claimant did not give the proper notices but attempted to claim an
equitable lien agains funds retained by the public authority. The claim was
denied. In the second case 1 the materialman also tried to reach funds retained
by the public authority, and again was unsuccessful. Here, the notices given
to the surety were timely, but the court held they were not in the proper form.
The case does not clearly state exactly what was wrong with the form of the
notice, but it appears that it was not a sufficiently verified and itemized account. If this is correct, some difference may exist between the McGregor and
Hardeman Acts as to the form of notice. In the Hardeman Act the form of
notice has been liberalized over that required by the old statutes." The second
case also held that where no showing was made that the surety actually received the notice (however it may have been given), it is necessary to show
that the notice was sent by registered or certified mail."
In General Electric Supply Co. v. EPCO Constructors, Inc.,' a case brought

in federal court, a dispute over funds retained in the hands of the prime contractor occurred between the materialman-supplier to a subcontractor working
on construction of a public school addition and a bank which had taken an
assignment of an account receivable from the subcontractor. Both claimants
had properly secured their interests: the bank, by perfecting a security
interest under the provisions of the Texas Business and Commerce Code;
the supplier, under the provisions of the McGregor Act." The court held
for the supplier on the rationale that the retainage requirement is designed
to protect first the person for whom the work is to be performed and then the
performers themselves-laborers and materialmen. The court held that to
the extent not specifically displaced by the Uniform Commercial Code, the
well-established rule remains in effect-prior claims of laborers and materialmen take precedence over claims of an assignee money lender.
II. ATTORNEY'S FEES AS CLAIMS FOR LABOR DONE AND
MATERIALS FURNISHED

Although two supreme court cases were decided which dealt with the
awarding of attorney's fees within the scope of article 2226,"' only one case
'1d.
0

art. 5160 (1971).
2 Barfield v. Henderson, 471 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1971), error
ref. n.r.e.
21 Bunch Elec. Co. v. Tex-Craft Builders, Inc., 480 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1972).
2
1See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5455
(Supp. 1972). See also United Benefit
Fire Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Plumbing Co., 363 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1962).
21480 S.W.2d at 46.
' 332 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
25TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (1971).
1 Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. Trinity Constr. Co., 481 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. 1972); Tacker
v. Phillips, 473 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1971).

"TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972), provides as follows: "Any per-
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will be discussed. In Pacific Coast Engineering Co. v. Trinity Construction

Co." the plaintiff was the fabricator of four large water control gates to be
installed into Canyon Dam. He sued for payment on the contract and claimed
reasonable attorney's fees, stating that the gates were "material furnished,"
within the meaning of the statute. The defendant argued that only raw
materials came within this definition. The court held for the plaintiff on the
basis that the test was whether the litigant furnished the final product or the
parts of which the final product was composed. The former does not constitute
materials furnished, but the latter does. The court stated that "the completed
dam ... is not 'material furnished.' But the mixed concrete, pipes, steel beams

and gates furnished by a subcontractor are 'material furnished' for the completion of the dam."' The court further held that the value upon which the
amount of attorney's fees are based is that of the item furnished by the subcontractor, not the value of the raw materials furnished to the subcontractor.
III. LAND DEVELOPMENT AND CONTRACTS OF SALE

An interesting case concerning land development and the Securities Act of
193 3"

is SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates."1 Lake Havasu Estates had sold to in-

vestors in excess of $3,500,000 worth of investment contracts without registration of the offerings with the SEC, despite repeated warnings. The SEC
finally filed suit seeking both preliminary and permanent injunctions against
the selling of such contracts. Lake Havasu argued that the sales to investors
did not involve "investment contracts" as that term is defined in the 1933
Act, and, therefore, were not subject to registration; that the SEC could not
show irreparable harm to the public; that return under the investment contracts was not dependent upon the profitability of the business; and finally,
that the defendant could stay in business only for some thirty to sixty days if
the injunctions were granted.
The court supported the Commission in finding that the contracts constituted
securities under the 1933 Act and were subject to registration. Although a return under the contract was not dependent upon the profitability of the business, the court emphasized that the investment of money was in a common
enterprise, and the investors were led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of promoters or a third party. It was further pointed out that the investors
relied solely upon Lake Havasu Estates for (a) selection of land, (b) selection
of a purchaser, (c) selection of a specific contract to be sold to the investor,
(d) collection agency services, (e) guarantee of monthly payments, (f)
guarantee of replacement of land contracts upon default, and (g) transfers
and recording. The court found irreparable harm to the public in that some
$3,500,000 of contracts were sold without the protection of the 1933 Act,
son, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity having a valid claim against a person or
corporation for services rendered, labor done, material furnished . . . may, if represented by
an attorney, also recover, in addition to his claim and costs, a reasonable amount as attorney's
fees."
28481 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. 1972).
20
Id. at 408.
2015 U.S.C. §5 77a-aa (1970).
21340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972).
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which harm more than offset the hardship to Lake Havasu an injunction
might cause.
Attention should be drawn to Carter v. Barclay" for an example of bad
closing technique. Simplifying the facts, closing was made and the purchaser
(P) gave the seller (S) his check. The check represented proceeds from a
bank loan, but the note had not been delivered to the bank. P and S were to
meet at the bank the next day. Through a mixup, they did not meet and S
immediately presented the check for payment, which was refused. S, apparently
deciding he never wanted to sell the land in question, moved on the land,
plowed it up, and removed some improvements which P had made. In a suit
by P, the court found that the deed had been delivered by S to P and that all
provisions in the contract dealing with payment of consideration as conditions
precedent to delivery had been merged in the deed, although the contract contained a non-merger clause. The court also found that the tender of P was
sufficient and S had acted fraudulently and with malice toward P. As to merger, the case appears to state the Texas rule that the parties have a duty to
have the prior contract provisions incorporated in the deed and that failure
to do so is sufficient to prevent the contention that the agreement was not
merged. Texas does not follow a rule based on the intent of the parties; agreements will be merged unless left out due to a collateral agreement or mistake
of the parties."3 It should be noted that the later problems could have been
avoided if all papers had been escrowed until the consideration was paid by
the purchaser.
In another case" the contract of sale was conditioned upon time being of
the essence. It was held that the seller could retain all payments as liquidated
damages. The payments made did not exceed a fair rental value of the premises
and hence did not exceed the injury suffered by the seller. No pleading or
showing was made that the provisions in the contract constituted a penalty.
IV. NOTES AND DEEDS OF TRUST

Bradford v. Thompson,' another case of first impression in this state, was
a surprising decision to many who are in the business of loaning money. In
this case 0 purchased a home, assuming a second lien note secured by a deed
of trust. The note required payments of $10 per month, and it expressly provided that the payments could be made "on or before" a certain day of each
month. After 0 had paid some $700 on the note, he requested that he be
allowed to pay in full. The note holder refused to allow him to do so. As 0
was then some $420 in advance, 0 stopped all payments. The noteholder
foreclosed, bought the property in at the trustee's sale, and later brought suit
in trespass to try title. After winning in both the trial court and the court of
appeals, the noteholder lost in the supreme court, where it was held that the
note was not in default at the time of foreclosure. The plaintiff argued that
" 476 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972).
3 Guardian Dev. Co. v. Jones, 86 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935), error
dismissed.
" Grant v. Sherwood Shores, Inc., 477 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972).
11470 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1971).
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under the terms of the note the excess payments were to be credited on principal and did not relieve the defendant from making the regular monthly
payments to cover the interest. The supreme court disagreed, stating that
excess payments made on an "on or before" note in one month may be applied to satisfy required payments in subsequent months. The question remains

of what to do with the excess payments in subsequent months. Apparently
when an excess exists for each month in which no payment is made, the out-

standing principal must be increased by the amount of interest payable in that
month, and the interest for that month is considered paid.
Two minor cases dealt with voidable sales under a deed of trust. In one

case' notice of acceleration upon default was held not to have been properly
made when the mortgagor could not be found, but mail was apparently deliverable at all times even if sent to his old address. Notice by mailing had not

been properly attempted. The other case"7 concerned a conflict between the
note and the deed of trust as to the amount of attorney's fees payable upon
default. It was held that attorney's fees are part of the obligation and are
controlled by the terms of the note.

In another case of first impression in Texas the apportionment of a condemnation award between the mortgagor and mortgagee was questioned. The
mortgagee held a vendor's lien, which, as is usual, contained no provisions
concerning condemnation. The court held that where the condemnation did not
impair the security of the mortgagee, under the rule of Carrollv. Edmondson"
the mortgagee had no right to the award. Texas follows the lien theory of
mortgages,' in that they only constitute a lien on the property, and the mortgagee generally has no right to possession until after foreclosure and sale.
However, in Texas, according to Edmondson the mortgagee may recover for
damages to his security where the acts complained of reduce the value of the
property below the amount then due and owing on the debt. This rule has
been criticized, since, as a practical matter, the security is impaired when the
initial loan ratio has not been maintained. In defining impairment of security
for the purpose of sharing in the condemnation award, the court indicated it
would take the original loan ratio into account in determining whether security
has in fact been impaired. Unfortunately, the supreme court refused to review

this case.
V. HOMESTEAD
A significant decision dealing with the marital homestead was handed down
by the supreme court in Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley.4' Blackacre was the homestead of H and W. A judgment was obtained against H and placed on record.
H and W were divorced, and W was awarded an undivided one-half interest
3"Lookwood v. Lisby, 476 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref.

.e.

"Lasater v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 471 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971).
36 Buell Realty Note Collection Trust v. Central Oak Inv. Co., 483 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.

Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
4"0 41 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931), judgment adopted.
Duty v. Graham, 12 Tex. 427 (1854).
41475 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1972).
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in the homestead tract in the divorce decree. W later remarried. W and her
new husband never occupied the old homestead property. For some seven
years prior to trial, W and her second husband moved around in connection
with his Air Force employment. The first husband, H, and W joined in this
litigation to remove the cloud of the judgment against H from the old homestead property. On the theory of abandonment, the trial court found against
the continued existence of homestead rights in the property after divorce. On
appeal it was held that the finding of abandonment was against the preponderance of the evidence and the case was remanded. However, the supreme court
reversed the holding of the court of appeals, and the trial court holding was
affirmed. The supreme court reasoned that the homestead exemption for the
property was lost when W moved from the premises, and was not based upon
the theory of abandonment.
In deciding the case the court distinguished between the continuing homestead right of a widow and those of a divorced person. Under the Texas Constitution ' the widow has the right to a homestead exemption for life, a right
which will survive remarriage. The court stated that loss of such homestead
right may come about through abandonment, but that a mere showing of
time away from the property will not be sufficient in itself. If a widow is
involved, the burden is on the creditor or other claimant to show abandonment,
since the constitution raises a presumption of a continuing homestead right in
the widow. The court contrasted the right of the divorced person to a homestead exemption, noting that the homestead rights of the divorced person
would last as long as the person remained the head of a family, but not for
life. Therefore, when W remarried the new husband had the right to designate
the homestead, and the intent of W became immaterial. Contrary to the rule
governing the loss of homestead rights by a widow, mere nonuse after remarriage by a divorced person is sufficient, and abandonment need not be
shown. When W moved from the old property and no longer used it as the
homestead of the new marital unit, the homestead rights of W were lost. The
court, however, did not expressly indicate what the result would have been
if W and her second husband had actually occupied the property as their
homestead.
VI. USURY

The case of Imperial Corporation of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp."
dealt with (1) whether (a) costs, expenses, and legal fees, or (b) loan or
commitment fees constituted front end interest which violated the usury laws
of the state, and (2) the effect of a savings clause in the event the sums to be
paid were usurious. Simplifying the facts to a great extent, D was the builder
and owner of a dormitory to be built near the University of Texas campus.
The loan agreement provided that D would reimburse the lender for costs,
expenses, and legal fees not to exceed $22,500 and to pay a loan or commit4TEx.

CONST. art. XVI,

§

52.

43453 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ment fee of $67,500. The deed of trust for the interim financing contained
the following savings clause:
No provision of this instrument or of the Notes shall require the payment
or permit the collection of interest in excess of the maximum permitted by
law. If any excess of interest in such respect is herein or in the notes provided for. . . the provisions of this paragraph shall govern, and ... the Mortgagors ... shall not be obligated to pay the amount of such interest to the
extent that it is in excess of the amount permitted by law."
When the initial advance was made by the lender both sums were deducted
from the amount advanced. Upon later default by D and suit by the lender,
the defense of usury was asserted. The Fifth Circuit held that the evidence
amply supported the finding that the $22,500 sum for legal fees, expenses of
the loan, and other expenses represented bona fide fees for services of the
lender's special agents and, therefore, did not constitute interest.
On the other hand, the commitment fee was held to be front end interest,
which was usurious but for the fact that the court spread it over the length of
the loan due to the presence of the savings clause:
Since the commitment fee is interest by operation of law and not because
the parties in their dealings with each other treated it as such, the agreements
here do not specify the period for which this interest is considered to be 'payment for the use of money.' If, as in this case, there is a savings clause, Texas
courts will give effect to it by spreading over the life of the loan the impact of
the judicially determined interest.'
Therefore, the only amount in excess of the statutory rate of interest as spread
over the life of the loan was considered usurious, a sum of $3,835.88.

"Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1343.

